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Authentication

Authentication answers the question: who are you? It is the process of verifying that a user, device, or system is who it claims to be. Authorization (a separate concern) answers what they are allowed to do. Getting authentication wrong means every authorization check downstream is meaningless — you are enforcing permissions against an identity that might be forged.

The Authentication Landscape

Modern applications rarely rely on a single authentication mechanism. A typical production system combines several layers:

graph TB
    subgraph "User-Facing"
        A[Password + MFA] --> AUTH[Auth Service]
        B[Passwordless / Passkeys] --> AUTH
        C[Social Login / OIDC] --> AUTH
        D[Biometric / WebAuthn] --> AUTH
    end

    subgraph "Service-to-Service"
        E[mTLS Certificates] --> GW[API Gateway]
        F[API Keys] --> GW
        G[OAuth Client Credentials] --> GW
    end

    AUTH --> T[Token Issuance]
    GW --> T
    T --> S[Session / JWT]

    style AUTH fill:#2563eb,color:#fff
    style GW fill:#7c3aed,color:#fff
    style T fill:#dc2626,color:#fff
    style S fill:#16a34a,color:#fff

Core Principles

Principle 1 — Defense in Depth

Never rely on a single authentication factor. Combine something the user knows (password), something they have (phone, security key), and something they are (biometric). Each additional factor exponentially increases the difficulty for an attacker.

Principle 2 — Fail Closed

If the authentication system is unavailable, deny access. Never fall back to a weaker mechanism or bypass authentication entirely because the identity provider is down.

Principle 3 — Minimize Token Lifetime

Short-lived tokens limit the window of exploitation. A stolen JWT that expires in 15 minutes is far less dangerous than one that is valid for 30 days.

Principle 4 — Never Roll Your Own Crypto

Use battle-tested libraries for token signing, password hashing, and key derivation. Custom implementations almost always contain subtle flaws that attackers can exploit.

Authentication Factors

FactorCategoryExamplesStrength
PasswordKnowledgePassphrase, PINLow (phishable)
TOTP CodePossessionAuthenticator appMedium (phishable)
Hardware KeyPossessionYubiKey, TitanHigh (phishing-resistant)
PasskeyPossession + InherenceFIDO2 credentialHigh (phishing-resistant)
BiometricInherenceFingerprint, Face IDMedium (not revocable)
Magic LinkPossessionEmail with tokenMedium (depends on email security)
Client CertificatePossessionmTLS certHigh (mutual verification)

Attack Surface Overview

graph LR
    subgraph "Credential Attacks"
        A1[Brute Force]
        A2[Credential Stuffing]
        A3[Password Spraying]
        A4[Phishing]
    end

    subgraph "Token Attacks"
        B1[Token Theft / XSS]
        B2[Session Hijacking]
        B3[JWT Algorithm Confusion]
        B4[Replay Attacks]
    end

    subgraph "Protocol Attacks"
        C1[OAuth Redirect Manipulation]
        C2[CSRF on Login]
        C3[Session Fixation]
        C4[Token Substitution]
    end

    A1 --> D[Compromised Account]
    A2 --> D
    A3 --> D
    A4 --> D
    B1 --> D
    B2 --> D
    B3 --> D
    B4 --> D
    C1 --> D
    C2 --> D
    C3 --> D
    C4 --> D

    style D fill:#dc2626,color:#fff

Section Contents

TopicWhat You Will Learn
JWT Deep DiveJWT structure, signing algorithms, token lifecycle, refresh rotation, revocation strategies, and claims design with jose
OAuth 2.0 & OIDCAuthorization Code + PKCE, Client Credentials, Device Code flows, OIDC ID tokens, and sequence diagrams
Session ManagementServer-side sessions with Redis, secure cookie configuration, session fixation prevention
MFA ImplementationTOTP (RFC 6238), WebAuthn/FIDO2, backup codes, and production TypeScript implementations
Passwordless AuthenticationMagic links, passkeys, email OTP, and the UX-security tradeoff
API Key DesignKey generation, hashing, rotation, scoping, and rate limiting per key
Biometric AuthenticationWebAuthn API, FIDO2 protocol, platform authenticators, and attestation

Choosing the Right Mechanism

flowchart TD
    START[What are you authenticating?] --> Q1{Human or Machine?}

    Q1 -->|Human - Browser| Q2{Need SSO?}
    Q1 -->|Human - Mobile| Q3{Platform capabilities?}
    Q1 -->|Machine - Service| Q4{Internal or External?}

    Q2 -->|Yes| OIDC[OAuth 2.0 + OIDC]
    Q2 -->|No| Q5{Security priority?}

    Q5 -->|Maximum| PASSKEY[Passkeys / WebAuthn]
    Q5 -->|Balanced| PWD_MFA[Password + MFA]
    Q5 -->|User convenience| MAGIC[Magic Links]

    Q3 -->|Biometric available| BIO[Biometric + Passkey]
    Q3 -->|Basic| PWD_MFA

    Q4 -->|Internal| MTLS[mTLS / SPIFFE]
    Q4 -->|External 3rd party| APIKEY[API Keys]
    Q4 -->|External trusted| CC[Client Credentials]

    style START fill:#2563eb,color:#fff
    style OIDC fill:#16a34a,color:#fff
    style PASSKEY fill:#16a34a,color:#fff
    style PWD_MFA fill:#16a34a,color:#fff
    style MAGIC fill:#16a34a,color:#fff
    style BIO fill:#16a34a,color:#fff
    style MTLS fill:#16a34a,color:#fff
    style APIKEY fill:#16a34a,color:#fff
    style CC fill:#16a34a,color:#fff

Common Mistakes

  • Storing passwords in plaintext or with weak hashing (MD5, SHA-1)
  • Using JWTs with "alg": "none" or accepting unsigned tokens
  • Not implementing rate limiting on login endpoints
  • Trusting the redirect_uri parameter without validation in OAuth flows
  • Storing session tokens in localStorage (vulnerable to XSS)
  • Not rotating refresh tokens on use
  • Hardcoding API keys in client-side code